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• Regulating for earlier (more) investment when the
firm chooses the amount of its investment
• Regulating the incumbent when it is forced to supply
– Traditional rate of return regulation
– Incentive regulation




• Infrastructure: high proportion of cost are sunk,
equivalently much investment is irreversible
• Future infrastructure costs are uncertain
• Future demand/surplus (welfare) is uncertain
• Modern regulation seeks to facilitate competition
Regulation and the incumbent
• Regulation seeks to induce
– The right timing (quantity of investment)
• Reasonable Regulation seeks :
- Financial viability i.e.
expected net return from investment should not be negative
- Lowest cost provision: rate base
- Replacement cost or
- Historical cost
• Incumbent firm may under regulation
- A Choose the timing of investment, or
- B Have its timing constrained (universal service)
Regulation A: firm is free to choose
investment timing
• Applicable to an extent in all regulation: asymmetric
information, eg maintenance
• In the environment of
– Uncertainty about future total consumer and producer benefits
– Uncertainty about future network costs
– Irreversible investment
– The regulator selecting historical or replacement cost rate base
– An incumbent with no competition
we reach the following conclusions
Regulation A: firm free to choose
• Generally the regulator seeks earlier investment
• Variation in demand and cost really matter with irreversible
investment
• Whether replacement cost or historical cost is desirable depends
on the industry
– Little variation in costs suggests preference for replacement cost
– Much variation in cost, and cost declines associated with increased
consumer benefits, suggest preference for historical cost
• The appropriate allowed rate of return is higher with replacement
(vs. historical) cost regulation: higher than standard WACC
• Setting the allowed rate of return too low leads to very substantial
reductions in consumer benefits as compared to setting it too high
Regulation B: firm forced to supply
• The firm has no options: must supply
• Future demand is uncertain (uncertain cost will also
matter)
• Regulation
– Seeks financial viability & lowest cost
– May be Rate-of-Return or Incentive Regulation
• First case: reversible investment
Second case: irreversibility
How much “profit” is “reasonable”?
Required to supply: reversible
C1 “Traditional” regulation: revenue based on
historical cost
Revenue Requirement = rate of return times cost at the
        beginning of the period
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How much “profit” is “reasonable”?
Required to supply: reversible
C2 “Incentive” regulation: revenue based on
replacement cost
Revenue Requirement = rate of return times cost at the
        beginning of the period, 
        adjusted for expected capital












- Can never fall
- Expands when required to meet demand
• Leads to stranding possibilities
• Distinguish between capacity and demand (number
of subscribers): 
i.e. Capacity (S) at least as large as Demand (X)
Adjusting the capacity of the regulated





• Typical volatility in “demand”: growth rates
• Telecom NZ Ltd (residential customer numbers)
Average: 1.5%, variation (std. dev.): 6.1%
• Electricity distribution networks (volume)




a) Historical cost times the risk adjusted rate, plus
b) Adjustment for expected capital gains/losses
resulting from price and/or demand reductions
Reasonable return when costs are sunk
required to supply
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Reasonable regulation when costs are sunk
incentive regulation when required to supply (C3, again)
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• Depend upon view of the future
• “Reasonable” allowed rate of return depends on
- Systematic risk (in profit, replacement cost, demand)
- Uncertainty in technology and prices
- Uncertainty in demand
• Lowest cost of “what” ?(present & future customers ?)
• Allowed rate of return on “what”? (rate base?)
Reasonable regulation when costs are sunk
incentive regulation when required to supply (C3, yet again)
• For historical cost ratebase
Allowed rate of return
may be much above r
• Form of regulation/rate of return/reset period must
be jointly determined











Asset Stranding Potentiality: summary
• Traditional regulation
- Customers absorb the risk, firm does not
- Prices vary over time
- Reasonable return may be as low as risk-free rate
• Incentive regulation
- Firm absorbs the risk
- Prices constant over time
- Reasonable return exceeds risk-free rate
• Social ranking
- Incentive regulation preferred to Traditional regulation









•   Risk-free rate is 5%
•   No systematic risk
* i.e. tilted annuity adds 2%
Examples
• Telecom NZ Ltd (residential customer numbers)
- Average growth rate: 1.5%,Std dev growth rate: 6.1%
- Reasonable rate of return requires 50 basis point
premium
• Electricity distribution networks (volume)
- Average growth rate: 2.0%, Std dev growth rate: 4.5%
- Reasonable rate of return requires 24 basis point
premium
• Mixture of technologies
1. Flexible, but expensive
2. Inflexible, but cheap
• E.g. mobile generation and maintenance














Regulation effects: technology mix
• Traditional regulation
- Either
- All flexible technology
- Or all inflexible technology
• Incentive regulation
- Optimal mix of two technologies
• Information requirements for regulation
– Lower for incentive regulation








̶Higher required rate of return
Conclusion: sunk investment affects the
cost of capital
• Where the firm is free to choose the allowed return is asymmetric in
its effects: too low is costly
• Rate-base, allowed return, reset periods interact and should be
determined jointly
• Uncertainty and variation matters: specific risks importantly affect
systematic risk, raise allowed rates of return under reasonable
regulation.
• Reasonable regulation does not imply the value of the firm is its
optimised replacement cost
• The standard WACC is but an element of the investment decision:
relevant risks should be recognised in the calculation of the allowed
rate of return (and the WACC).
